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This paper studies the impact of a government's e±ciency on the
taxation policy of a state. Namely, we claim that the countries are
di®erent both in the way they tax capital and the way they spend
the collected revenue. We build a model of 2 countries competing for
foreign investment, government of one of them is more e±cient than
the other one, which means that it is able to produce more public
good out of the same revenue. We show that the country with the
more e±cient government will charge higher income tax from ¯rms.
The theoretical predictions are then tested on a sample of OECD
countries, years 1996-2005. In general, empirical results are in line
with the theory.
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11 Introduction
This paper studies the impact of a government's e±ciency on the interna-
tional taxation policy of a state. Namely, we claim that when it comes to
the competition for foreign investments it is important to account not only
the way the countries tax capital but also the way they spend the collected
revenue. With regard to this, we di®erentiate governments of the countries
by their productivity when transforming tax revenue into public goods - the
concept, which we call governmental e±ciency. At the same time, we assume
that the ¯rms, when choosing the location of investment, consider not only
the tax rate set in the country, but also the quality of public infrastructure
present there. The result of this asymmetric tax competition setting is that
the capital tax rates are di®erent in equilibrium: the more e±cient country
attracts investments even with the higher tax, while the less e±cient one is
forced to use lower ¯scal pressure as its only instrument of inducing ¯rms to
stay.
The idea of asymmetric equilibrium in ¯scal competition for a mobile
factor seems to be well supported by the empirical evidence. For instance,
in European Union there are basically no restrictions for capital movement,
and many studies ¯nd the evidence of strategic interaction between Euro-
pean governments.1 However, the variation of capital income tax rates in
member-countries remains high: e®ective average tax rate (EATR), devel-
oped by Devereux and Gri±th [2003], ranged in 2005 from 11% in Latvia
and Ireland to 32% in Germany. Papers like Baldwin and Krugman [2004],
Zissimos and Wooders [2008], Stewart and Webb [2006] point to the fact that
despite competition pressure some countries in EU, like Germany, France or
Netherlands managed to tax capital heavier than the countries like Ireland,
Portugal or Greece. The data on EATR suggest that the gap between the tax
rates in these countries is about 4-5 percentage points and persists through
years, even though the tax rates have been declining in almost all countries.
While the classical tax competition literature2 fails to do so, our paper
provides an explanation for asymmetric outcome of ¯scal competition game,
apparently emerging in the above mentioned example. To obtain this result
we are making two main assumptions. From the one side, we claim that
governments of the countries are exogenously endowed with di®erent degree
1See, for example, Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano [forthcoming], Gri±th and
Klemm [2004], Nicodµ eme [2006]
2Starting from Oates [1972], Wilson [1986], and Zodrow and Mieszkowski [1986]
2of e±ciency. Namely, it is assumed that in the framework of two countries
government of one of them can produce more public good out of the same rev-
enue. From the other side, ¯rms willing to invest in either of the countries are
assumed to have di®erent need for public inputs provided by governments.3
As a result, more e±cient country is able to attract investments even when it
charges higher tax. It happens because even with high tax the country o®ers
more-than-proportional increase in the level of public good production, and
succeeds to attract a large portion of investments. Therefore, it can run a
balanced budget, and maintain higher level of tax burden.
There are also alternative explanations for asymmetric equilibrium in
the tax competition game. One branch of the literature in the ¯eld explores
how interaction between symmetric jurisdictions may lead to the asymmetric
outcome.4 Most of the studies here assume a presence of a scale or agglom-
eration economies, which eventually, following the terminology of Baldwin
and Krugman [2004], turns one jurisdiction into a high-tax core, and other
into a low-tax periphery.5 At the same time, Zissimos and Wooders [2008],
B¶ enassy-Qu¶ er¶ e, Gobalraja, and Trannoy [2007] show that even without ag-
glomeration economies symmetric jurisdictions may turn into asymmetric
core and periphery if governments compete in both tax rates and public ex-
penditures: the core would set higher tax rate and provide higher level of
public inputs than periphery. While the setup of our model is very similar
to Zissimos and Wooders [2008], we assume initial asymmetry between ju-
risdictions, and thus get a clear direction of asymmetry in equilibrium tax
rates. Therefore, we assert that there are other factors but pure luck (as in
all papers mentioned above) that create high-tax/low-tax distribution.
Another branch in the current literature, to which our paper is related,
explains asymmetric outcome by an exogenously given asymmetry between
jurisdictions competing. Usually, the asymmetry concerns the size of the
jurisdictions, be it either capital endowment or population (labour). Wilson
3Here we are using the terms "public good" and "public input" interchangeably. In
the literature, public input is often referred to an output of government, which bene¯ts
mostly businesses, while public good bene¯ts households. In our paper, both public good
and public input mean basically the same thing, i.e. some output of the government,
which is useful both for ¯rms and households. We explain our assumptions in the Section
2.
4For the good overview of tax competition literature, and the one with asymmetric
outcomes in particular, refer to Wilson [1999] and to Wilson and Wildasin [2004]
5See Baldwin and Krugman [2004], Kind, Knarvik, and Schjelderup [2000], Ludema
and Wooton [2000], Borck and P°Ä uger [2006], Bucovetsky [2005]
3[1987] shows that under free trade and free capital movement the country
endowed initially with more capital will have higher capital income tax rate.
Wilson [1991], Bucovetsky [1991], Hau°er and Wooton [1999], Bucovetsky
and Hau°er [2007] consider jurisdictions with di®erent population and show
that the bigger one will set capital income tax higher. Yet, there are no
papers, to our knowledge, that account for the e±ciency of the governments
involved in tax competition. Indeed, all of the studies assume that each
jurisdiction can produce the same amount of public good out of one unit of
the private good.
At the same time, it is clear that not only the amount of public spending
is important for attracting investment but also how e±ciently it is spent, and
the governments in real world are di®erent in their e±ciency. For instance,
in European Union the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF), issued annually
by Heritage Foundation, adjusted for our purposes, which arguably proxies
governmental e±ciency quite well,6 follows the same pattern as the capital
income tax rates: it is on average 30-40 points out of 500 higher for low-tax
Greece and Portugal than for high-tax France, Germany or Netherlands.7
The negative correlation between e®ective average tax rate and IEF in EU is
clearly seen on the Figure 1. However, while there are many papers study-
ing the impact of jurisdictional freedom (degree of ¯scal decentralization)
on governmental e±ciency,8 the other direction of causality - the impact of
governmental e±ciency on the outcome of competition between jurisdictions
- is omitted in the literature.
Our paper is an attempt to ¯ll the above-mentioned gap, present in the
existing literature. Namely, we propose the model of two countries, engaged
in the competition for the foreign investments. There is continuum of the
multinational companies willing to invest in either of two possible locations.
They are assumed to be technologically 'attached' to the amount of public
good produced in a country. Therefore, they make their investment choices
comparing not only the tax rates in the competing countries, but also the
reduction of their production cost due to the presence of the business infras-
tructure. At the same time, the government of one country is relatively more
e±cient than the government of the other, which allows it to produce rela-
6We discuss the proxies for governmental e±ciency in Section 3
7Which should mean that the latter countries are more e±cient, since by de¯nition the
bigger IEF means lower ranking of a country
8See, for example, Barankay and Lockwood [2007], Khaleghain [2003], Fisman and
Gatti [2001], Huther and Shah [1998], Mello and Barenstein [2001], Treisman [2002]
4Figure 1: Tax burden vs. governmental e±ciency in EU
Unweighted average in 3 groups: EU-Core - France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands;
CEEC - Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary; EU-Periphery - Spain,
Portugal, Greece
Y -axis: on the left - e®ective average tax rate (EATR), on the right - Index of Economic
Freedom (IEF) without tax burden, divided by 100
Source: EATR - Devereux and Gri±th [2003], Kotans [2005]; IEF - HF [2006]
tively more public goods out of the same tax revenue, and therefore attract
more ¯rms. We ¯nd that in the equilibrium the more e±cient country always
sets the tax higher than the less e±cient one.
Finally, we test the model empirically, using the data of 28 countries,
from 1996 to 2005. As a proxy for tax burden we use the e®ective aver-
age tax rate (EATR), which is calculated from the statutory capital income
tax rates adjusted with the country-speci¯c taxation legislation. EATR ba-
sically de¯nes the share of the ¯rm's future cash °ow, which it will have
to give up for a country's government in case the investment takes place.
Governmental e±ciency is proxied by the Index of Economic Freedom, and
by gross domestic product per capita. The methodology we use is standard
for testing for strategic interaction between several players. We ¯nd that,
indeed, the 'rest-of-the-world' tax rate and the governmental e±ciency a®ect
signi¯cantly positively the tax rate in a given country. Therefore, the main
conclusions of the model are con¯rmed.
The structure of the paper is the following. In the Section 2 we set up
and solve the model, described above. Next Section, 3, is devoted to the
empirical testing of the results obtained in the Section 2. Finally, Section 4
5concludes.
2 The Model
Here we present a theoretical grounding for the fact, that the tax rates in
the countries should not necessarily converge to a common value. Namely,
we build a model, in which two countries are engaged in competition for
foreign investments. One of the countries is relatively more e±cient than the
other one, meaning that the government of that country is able to produce
relatively more public good out of the same revenue. The countries play a
game, in which they choose both the tax rate and the level of public good
produced. The result is that in Nash equilibrium more e±cient country
always charge higher tax than the 'ine±cient' one. Moreover, the reaction
functions of both countries are upward sloping.
2.1 Setup of the Model
The basic features of our model we borrow from Zissimos and Wooders [2008].
However, we adjust their model to account for di®erences in governmental
e±ciency, and this brings quite a signi¯cant departure from their results.
The model consists of 2 countries, A and B, and multinational absentee
¯rms, willing to invest in either of these countries. Governments of both
countries levy tax on every ¯rm entering the market, and produce public
goods out of the collected revenue. Firms make their investment choices tak-
ing into account the tax rates and levels of public good production, o®ered
by the governments, ¿A, ¿B, gA, gB correspondingly. After locating the pro-
duction in one of the countries each ¯rm produces one unit of some good and
sells it on the world market.
We concentrate ¯rst on the behavior of the ¯rms, then go back to the
governments.
2.1.1 Firms
We assume continuum of ¯rms in the economy. All of them are owned by
absentees, i.e. governments do not take their pro¯ts into account when de-
signing their ¯scal policy. Public goods, provided by the government, are
assumed to a®ect positively the production technology of each ¯rm. With
6regard to this each ¯rm is characterized by parameter s, which is distributed
uniformly on [0;1]. The pro¯t function of the ¯rm s (¯rm of type s) looks
the following way:
¦i = p ¡ c ¡ ¿i + slngi; i 2 fA;Bg (1)
Here p is the price of the good on the world market, and c is some cost
of producing this good. Both p and c are exogenously given in the model.
Neither of them depends on the ¯scal policy of a particular government, i.e.
they do not change with ¿i and gi. This way we ignore any price e®ects of
taxation, and assume it is not distortive. This assumption may seem more
realistic when one thinks of big multinational ¯rm choosing location for small
investment, which will have close-to-nothing e®ect on the ¯rm's global pricing
policy. In general, p and c are not important for our further analysis, and
the only thing we demand is that the di®erence between them is big enough
to assure non-negative pro¯ts of the ¯rm.
¿i is the tax ¯rm has to pay if it invests in the country i, and gi is the
amount of public good produced by government i. slngi is the ¯rm's s cost
reduction of producing one unit of the good due to public input. It exerts de-
creasing returns to scale with regard to gi, which we would naturally expect,
and it is increasing with type of ¯rm s. This way we di®erentiate between
¯rms, and claim that some of them bene¯t from public infrastructure present
in a country more than the others. For instance, if one thinks of di®erent
industries, then, say, a producer of microprocessors or generic drugs will
bene¯t a lot from highly-educated labor, high level of public R&D spending
and qualitative copyright laws. Such ¯rms are of high s type. At the same
time, a producer of some crop or cheap clothes will not need much public
infrastructure and care more about the taxes it pays. Therefore, it has low
s type.
Each ¯rm faces the tax rates in counties A and B - ¿A and ¿B respectively,
and the levels of public good provision - gA and gB. For every s if ¡¿A +
slngA > ¡¿B + slngB then ¯rm s invests in the country A, if ¡¿A + slngA <
¡¿B+slngB then it goes to the country B. Otherwise, ¯rm s is indi®erent. As
a result, share of the ¯rms ^ sB will go to country B, the others ^ sA = 1 ¡ ^ sB
will go to A. Obviously, both ^ sA and ^ sB are between 0 and 1, and both
depend on strategic interaction between governments.
Finding the expression for ^ sB = ^ sB(¿A;¿B;gA;gB) is crucial for further
analysis. We proceed with the following lemma:
7Lemma 2.1 Depending on ¿A; ¿B; gA; and gB ^ sB can only take values 0, 1,





In particular, when ¿A > ¿B, gA > gB, and the di®erence between tax rates
is su±ciently small:
0 < ^ sB = ^ s < 1 (3)
and ^ s is the type of ¯rm, which is indi®erent between investing in either of
countries.
Proof See the Appendix A.1
Lemma 2.1 tells that if there exists a ¯rm of type ^ s, the after-tax pro¯ts
of which will be equal in both countries, ¯rms of higher type will be willing
to invest in the country with higher tax rate, but also with higher level
of public good provision. On a contrary, ¯rms of lower type will invest in
low-tax-low-public-good-provision country.
We continue with the governments in the model.
2.1.2 Governments
Each government sets the tax rate and chooses the level of public good pro-
vision in a jurisdiction. It's objective is to maximize the di®erence between
the revenue it collects from investors and the amount it spends to produce
public goods.
The objective function of the governments A and B look the following
way:
² government A, given ¿B and gB, -
max
¿A;gA
¿A ¤ (1 ¡ ^ sB) ¡ gA=b; b > 1 (4)
² government B, given ¿A and gA, -
max
¿B;gB
¿B ¤ ^ sB ¡ gB; (5)
where ^ sB = ^ sB(¿A;¿B;gA;gB) is determined jointly by the decisions of
government A and government B.
8¿A¤(1¡^ sB) in the objective function (4) is the total revenue of government A
- tax rate ¿A multiplied by a tax base of the government A, which is equal to
the share of ¯rms ^ sA = 1¡^ sB investing in the country A. Analogously in the
objective function (5), ¿B¤^ sB is the revenue of government B. gA=b and gB are
the amounts of public spending by governments A and B correspondingly.
Governments are assumed to run balanced budget, so gA=b cannot exceed
¿A ¤ (1 ¡ ^ sB), and gB cannot exceed ¿B ¤ ^ sB.
As it can be seen from (4), the transformation from private good into
public one is not one-to-one as it is assumed in most of the similar models:9
to produce one unit of the public good the government A has to use only
1=b; b > 1 units of the private good, while for the government B the trans-
formation is one-to-one. In this way we assume that the government of the
country A is more e±cient in producing the public good then the government
of the country B, i.e. it is able to produce more units of the public good
out of the same amount of the private good. b is referred to as an e±ciency
parameter.
The objective functions (4)-(5) are consistent with two di®erent views on
the nature of a government. First view, ¯rstly developed by Brennan and
Buchanan [1980],10 considers government as an ever-growing Leviathan, in-
terested only in increasing its size and extracting as much rents from holding
the o±ce as possible. If we assume malevolent government in our case, and
no way households can control it, then maximizing the di®erence between
revenue and spending means exactly maximizing the rents from holding the
o±ce.
From the other side, under our initial assumptions, the government can
also be considered as the one maximizing country's welfare. Indeed, as all
¯rms are owned by absentee, the government is not taking into account
the ¯rms' pro¯ts. Additionally, we ignore all the price e®ects, which may
be caused by ¯scal policy, and we abstract from all the possible good and
bad sides of FDI.11 As a result, the only way the ¯rms a®ect the welfare
of the country is by paying the tax to the government. The revenue less
public expenditures then may be distributed among households or used for
production of public goods, which bene¯t households. Therefore, benevolent
government will have the objective function like (4) or (5).12
9See Introduction for the discussion
10See also Edwards and Keen [1996], Zissimos and Wooders [2008]
11See, for example, Rama [2001], Javorcik [2004], Chor [2006]
12There would be some trade o® if we assume that the households receive also utility
9It is left to note that the tax base of each government ((1 ¡ ^ sB) for the
government A, ^ sB for the government B) depends on the choices of both of
them. Therefore they set their tax rates and levels of public good production
strategically.
2.2 Solution of the model
Competing for foreign investments, governments are engaged in a tax com-
petition game, where the objective functions are given by (4) and (5). The
equilibrium of this game is the intersection of corresponding governmental
reaction functions. However, ¯nding of those gets complicated by the fact
that function ^ sB is not di®erentiable everywhere (as we can see from the
Lemma 2.1). As a result, the objective functions of both governments are
not di®erentiable at certain points, so we cannot use standard methods of
calculus to maximize them.
Intuitively, however, it should be clear that in equilibrium both govern-
ments are willing to attract strictly positive share of investments to their
countries. Country A, being relatively more e±cient, has better chances of
doing that by o®ering to ¯rms high level of public good provision. Conse-
quently, it can also charge high income tax, as a trade-o® between higher
revenue per ¯rm and smaller share of ¯rms willing to invest in high-tax-high-
public-good-provision country. At the same time, country B can attract
low-s ¯rms by o®ering low tax rate. Intuitively, we conjecture then that in
equilibrium tax rate, as well as level of public good provision in country A
are higher than in country B, and 0 < ^ s < 1 - there exist a ¯rm, which is
indi®erent between investing in either of two countries. We give a formal
proof of our conjecture in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2 Suppose we have a game given by equations (4) and (5). Denote
by ¿¤
i ; g¤
i; i 2 fA;Bg the corresponding reaction functions of governments
A and B. Then the following statements are true:
i. if ¿B is su±ciently big (for any 0 < gB < ¿B) then it is optimal for
the government A to follow "mimicking" strategy, i.e. set ¿¤
A = ¿B and
g¤
A = gB + ², where ² is in¯nitesimally small;
from public inputs produced by the government, as it is argued, for example, by B¶ enassy-
Qu¶ er¶ e, Gobalraja, and Trannoy [2007]. For simplicity, we do not touch this issue here
10ii. there are values of (¿B;gB) for which the government A plays ¿¤
A > ¿B
and g¤
A > gB. In particular, this strategy of the government A is optimal
in the neighborhood of (0;0);
iii. for all ¿A it holds that ¿¤
B < ¿A.
Proof See in Appendix A.2
The Lemma 2.2 tells us two things. First, optimal response of government
A depends crucially on the magnitude of ¿B. Indeed, facing the tax rate
and level of public good provision from country B government A can always
adopt ¯scal policy such that to attract all ¯rms. Namely, it can set tax rate
equal to ¿B, and produce slightly higher amount of public good. More e±-
cient government A can always do that since both governments run balanced
budget. Hence the maximal amount of public good government B can pro-
duce is gB = ¿B,13 while government A can use its e±ciency advantage and
produce up to gA = b¿B with the same tax rate. As a result, government A
can always get ¿B ¡gB=b as its rents to holding the o±ce (di®erence between
the revenue and spending, as in it's objective function).
Government A, however, may deviate from the strategy of mimicking
government's B ¯scal policy. Namely, it can either decrease level of public
spending, while leaving tax rate the same (or also decrease it), or it can
increase both tax rate and level of public good production. Since types of
¯rms are distributed uniformly on the [0;1] interval, both strategies will cause
decrease in share of ¯rms willing to invest in country A: "decrease" strategy
will defer high-s ¯rms from investment, while "increase" strategy will do the
same with low-s ¯rms. Despite this decline in ^ sA, the di®erence between
revenue and public spending may still increase: by even higher decrease of
public spending in "decrease" strategy, and by even higher increase in tax
rate in "increase" strategy.
The Lemma 2.1 tells us that if ¿B is reasonably small the government A
will go for "increase" strategy. Therefore, it will ¯nd optimal to tax higher
the most demanding high-s ¯rms, while letting low-s ¯rms invest in country
B. If the tax rate in country B is too high, however, the decline in ^ sA
outweighs the increase in tax per ¯rm for those who decide to remain in the
economy. This result is quite intuitive, since neither in "decrease" nor in
"mimicking" strategy can government A use its e±ciency advantage.
13That is if government B succeed to attract all ¯rms to the economy
11The second statement of the lemma tells that the optimal response of
government B will always be lower than the tax in country A. Being disad-
vantaged by its lower productivity, government B will never adopt "increase"
or "mimicking" strategy, and ¯nd it optimal to set low tax and low level of
public good production, and attract the least demanding low-s ¯rms.
The behavior of both government's reaction functions, given in Lemma
2.2 leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3 Suppose the game is given by equations (4) and (5). Then
the Nash equilibria exist and in Nash equilibria ¿A > ¿B, gA > gB, and




Proof First thing to note is that objective functions of both governments
are continuous, therefore both reaction functions will be continuous as well.14
Now, as it follows from the Lemma 2.2, the optimal ¿A is always not lower
than the 45-degree line on (¿B;¿A) plane (for su±ciently small ¿B, ¿B smaller
than some ~ ¿B, ¿A is strictly above the line, otherwise it is on the line, i.e. ¿A =
¿B). At the same time, government B, following its optimal taxation strategy,
never sets tax higher or equal than ¿A. Therefore, the whole its reaction
function lies below the 45-degree line in (¿A;¿B) plane, or equivalently, above
45-degree line in (¿B;¿A) plane. Both reaction functions are continuous, and
on the interval [0; ~ ¿B] function ¿A¡(¿B)¡1 changes its sign.15 Hence, optimal
response functions intercept in the area above the 45-degree line in (¿B;¿A)
plane (on the interval [0; ~ ¿B]). ¿NE




A should also be higher than gNE
B since otherwise all ¯rms will invest
in country B, and it is not optimal. Hence, following Lemma 2.1, the share
of ¯rms investing in country B in equilibrium is strictly between 0 and 1 -
statement (6) holds.
In Proposition 2.3 we prove the main result of our paper: in equilibrium, more
e±cient country sets tax rate higher. It gives up some share of low-s type
¯rms, but taxes the remaining ¯rms heavier. At the same time, having no
other instruments, less e±cient country ¯nds it optimal to attract investment
with the help of tax dumping.
14See Fudenberg and Tirole [1991] for the proof
15(¿B)¡1 here is the inverse function of government's B optimal response
12Besides the main result, the proposition also establishes the fact that in
equilibrium ^ sB is strictly between 0 and 1, and equals to ^ s. This allows us to
specify further the objective functions of the governments, and to ¯nd Nash
equilibrium explicitly. We will need this for the empirical part of the paper.
2.2.1 Additional properties of the model
In this section we provide few auxiliary results, which we will use in the
empirical part of the paper. In particular, we show that the reaction func-
tions of the governments are increasing with corresponding tax rate and the
e±ciency parameter b.
Following the Proposition 2.3, we know that the solution of the game
(4)-(5) lies in the range where both governmental objective functions are
di®erentiable, so we can rewrite them and use standard calculus methods for
further analysis.
The objective functions of the governments will look the following way:
² government A -
max
¿A;gA
¿A ¤ (1 ¡
¿A ¡ ¿B
lngA ¡ lngB
) ¡ gA=b (7)



















The ¯rst order conditions of problems (7)-(8) will look the following way:





























¡ 1 = 0 (13)
Optimal response (¿¤
A;g¤
A) of government A is implicitly given by identi-
ties (10)-(11). Identities (12)-(13) de¯ne optimal response of government
B (¿¤
B;g¤
B) as a function of ¿A and gA. We continue with the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 2.4 Suppose the game is given by (10)-(11). Then:
i. ¿¤
A is increasing function of ¿B - reaction function of the government A
is upward sloping;
ii. ¿¤
A is increasing function of b - optimal response of government A in-
creases with its e±ciency;
iii. ¿¤
B is increasing function of ¿A - reaction function of the government
B is upward sloping.
Proof See in the Appendix A.3
The Proposition 2.4 basically supports general ¯ndings in the tax competition
literature16 that more aggressive ¯scal policy of one government should cause
similar reaction from other governments. If government B decides to raise the
tax rate, government A will get an opportunity to do the same thing without
a®ecting or even increasing the share of ¯rms investing in the country. Thus
the di®erence between revenue and public spending will increase, so such
policy response will be optimal. Similar logic works with government B as
well, and asymmetry of countries does not play any role in this situation.
Another statement of the proposition tells that the ¯scal policy of the
government A becomes more aggressive with the increase in its e±ciency, i.e.
the higher is the b the higher is the tax rate in country A, leaving ¿B and gB
the same. This is quite intuitive result, which is consistent with the logic of
the paper in general. Indeed, a government becomes more e±cient, so it is
able to produce even more public good out of the same revenue. Therefore,
even after increase in tax rate it can still attract high-s ¯rms by o®ering even
better public infrastructure.
16See Wilson [1999] for review
142.3 Conclusions
The main result of this section, shown in Proposition 2.3, is that in equi-
librium more e±cient country charges higher tax on investment. It happens
because in optimum government A decides to extract rents from its e±ciency
and raises tax rate above the government's B level. Thus it gives up some
part of the least demanding ¯rms, but collects higher revenue from those
who stay. From the other side, government B is forced to set lower tax,
since it is the only way it can compete with more e±cient country for foreign
investments. This way we explain an empirical fact that despite the harsh
competition for mobile tax base some governments manage to sustain high
level of taxes still attracting ¯rms to economies.
The reaction functions of both governments are proved to be increasing,
which together with the main result, is a testable prediction of the model.
Indeed, it is optimal for both countries to increase the tax rate in response to
the same action of the neighbor's government. Another testable prediction
of our model is that the ¯scal policy of the government A becomes more
aggressive with increase in b, i.e. we claim that getting more e±cient a
government should charge a higher tax on foreign investments, other things
being equal. As a result, in equilibrium the di®erence between tax rates
in two countries gets bigger with the di®erence between the productivity of
their governments.
We proceed further with the estimation of the model.
3 Testing of the Theory
We now turn to the empirical testing the model. In doing so we follow
Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano [forthcoming] and Brueckner [2003] in
their methodology. Speci¯cally, we run IV estimation on a cross-section of
28 countries, years from 1996 to 2005. Accounting for a few control variables,
we ¯nd the coe±cients near the 'rest-of-the-world' average tax rate and near
the proxy for governmental e±ciency to be highly signi¯cant and positive, as
it was predicted by the theory.
The structure of the chapter is the following. Section 3.1 describes the
estimation model and some econometrics issues concerned with its estima-
tion. De¯nitions of variables, used in the regression, are given in the Section
3.2, the results are presented in the Section 3.3.
153.1 Econometric Model
Extending our theoretical model to n countries we obtain the system of equa-
tions:
¿i;t = Ri(¿¡i;t;Xi;t); i = 1;:::;n; t1 · t · tk (14)
where ¿i;t denotes the tax rate in the country i in the year t, ¿¡i;t's - tax
rates in the same year in the rest of the countries in the sample, Xi;t is a
vector of other variables in°uencing the tax rate in the country, and Ri(X)
denotes the country-speci¯c reaction function. In principle, setting the tax
rate government can react di®erently on the tax rates of each country. How-
ever, the estimation of separate coe±cients is hardly possible due to a large
number of the countries and short time series of the sample. To overcome the
above-mentioned di±culty, we take standard approach for testing the pres-
ence of the strategic interaction between jurisdictions.17 Instead of including
separate countries in the equation, we calculate the average "world tax rate"





!ij¿j;t+µ1Xi;t;1+µXi;t;¡1+²i;t; i = 1;:::;n; t1 · t · tk : (15)
Similar to above, here t is a time-variable, varying from some initial year
t1 to tk. n is the number of countries(jurisdictions) in the sample. Then
¿i;t is the tax rate in the country i at the time t. Xi;t is the set of control
variables for country i at time t. Note that we intentively divided vector X
on two parts: X1 and the rest, X¡1. This is because we want to stress on the
importance of one of the control variables - government e±ciency. Finally,
!ij; i = 1;:::;n; j = 1;:::;n are country-to-country speci¯c weights, used
to calculate the average 'rest-of-the-world' tax for a country i. They are
assumed to be exogenously given, i.e. de¯ned by the author of the research.
Note that the !ij's do not change with time. ®; ¯; µ are to be estimated
by the regression. We are particularly interested in ¯ and µ1. Our model
predicts them to be positive.
The choice of !ij's in our model is not straightforward. The usual ap-
proach in the literature is to take either uniform weights or those based on
the distance between the jurisdictions. While we estimate our model with
uniform weights, our opinion is that the distance is not the main factor in°u-
encing investment decisions and setting tax rates. Therefore, in addition to
17See Brueckner [2003], Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano [forthcoming], for example
16uniform !ij's, we also report results with 4 other kinds of weights. First one
is based on the size of the country: the bigger its GDP the bigger is its role in
the "rest-of-the-world" tax rate. The other three weights are based on FDI
°ows between the countries. Namely, we assign bigger weight to more open
counties, i.e. those with higher relation of FDI °ows to GDP. In the ¯rst case
we take FDI °ows for the last 3 years, in the second - average FDI °ows for
the period studied. Finally, the last weights matrix is formed using the data
on FDI in°ows split by geographical area. Having divided the world into
several (7 in total) regions, we assume the role of the country j in forming
the tax rate in the country i bigger the bigger is the share of investments
coming from certain region to the country j (comparing with the investments
to the rest of the world), and the bigger is the share of investments from this
region to the country i comparing with another regions. We ¯nd this weights
system most relevant to our estimation framework. At the same time, we
report the results with all 5 weights.
Two main econometric issues must be confronted when estimating (5).
Firstly, as all ¿i's at time t are jointly determined, their weighted sum will
clearly be endogenous and correlated with the error term. Indeed, it is easy
to see if we rewrite the equation (5) in the matrix form:
¿ = ¯W¿ + Xµ + ²; (16)
where W is the matrix of weights and ® is included in vector µ. It is possible
now to derive equilibrium ¿'s:
¿ = (I ¡ ¯W)
¡1Xµ + (I ¡ ¯W)
¡1²; (17)
where I is identity matrix. As it can be seen from the equation (17) every
element of ¿, ¿i, depends on all ²'s, which leads to endogeneity in (15), and
hence to inconsistent OLS estimates.
The second issue, which stops us from estimating (15) directly, is that the
error terms in (15) may be spatially correlated, i.e. ² satis¯es the relationship:
² = °M² + »; (18)
where ° is a certain vector and M is a certain matrix, depending on the rela-
tions between error terms. Such correlation may occur when the estimation
model does not control for certain jurisdiction-speci¯c characteristics, which
may in turn be spatially dependent. As a result, some of ²i's and ²j's may be
17correlated, which will drive us to the wrong conclusion about the presence
of strategic interaction, when there is no such. Refer to Brueckner [2003] for
detailed description of these issues.
We follow Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano [forthcoming] in their meth-
ods of resolving these problems. Namely, we use instrumental variables ap-
proach. At the ¯rst stage we regress ¿i;t on Xi;t, then use ¯tted values from
the ¯rst-stage regression, ^ ¿i;t, to calculate weighted averages for each country
-
P
j6=i !ij^ ¿i;t. These ¯tted values are asymptotically uncorrelated with the
error term in (15), therefore OLS will produce consistent estimates. So, on
the second stage of our estimation we run the regression (15), but with ^ ¿j;t
instead of ¿j;t in the right-hand side. In addition, the same very method also
helps to resolve our second problem too.
Another way is to use WX as the instrument for W¿ in the same manner
as in above paragraph. Substituting the
P
j6=i !ij¿j;t with the ¯tted values
from the ¯rst-stage regression will also lead to production of asymptotically
consistent OLS estimates. With slight adjustments in speci¯cation, we use
both methods in the paper. Even though the directions of the estimates do
not change, the second method proved to produce more robust results than
the ¯rst one.
3.2 Data
We use a sample of 28 countries, years from 1996 till 2005. Countries in-
clude EU-15 (except Denmark and Luxembourg), Switzerland, Norway, USA,
Canada, Japan, ¯nally Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Romania. As a result, 280 obser-
vations are included in the sample.
As a dependent variable we take widely used nowadays e®ective average
tax rate(EATR18). It is de¯ned as a proportion of the pre-tax pro¯t from
previously invested in the country assets, taken by the state as a tax levy.
EATR is calculated for a ¯rm, which invests one unit, ¯nanced by equity,
debt or retained earnings, into plants or machinery with prede¯ned rate of
pro¯tability (usually, 20% per period considered). Then the pro¯ts under no-
taxation and existing taxation system in the country are compared. EATR,
generally, depends heavily on the statutory tax rate, and on the de¯nition
of the taxable pro¯t in each separate country, which concerns usually to
18This is the name of the variable in the regression
18depreciation allowances. The indicator is claimed to be the main measure of
the tax burden for multinationals choosing the country to invest in. This is
de¯nitely what we consider in our model, when ¯rms invest in the country
with higher after-tax pro¯t. Therefore we have chosen this measure of the tax
rate. At the same time, we also check the results when statutory tax rates
are used as a dependent variable. EATR's for 'old'-OECD(i.e. all except
CEE countries) countries were calculated by Devereux and Gri±th and used
in their paper Devereux and Gri±th [2002]. For the rest of the countries
EATR's were calculated by Bellak, Leibrecht, and Romisch [2005], Jacobs,
Spengel, Finkenzeller, and Roche [2004], and Kotans [2005]. Namely, we use
the ones adjusted for country-speci¯c in°ation and interest rate. Statutory
tax rates are also adjusted for local income taxation.
While the choice of the tax burden measure is more or less obvious, it is
much more challenging to come up with appropriate proxy of governmental
e±ciency. Theoretical model solves this issue in a simple way: more e±cient
government produces more public goods out of the same revenue. However,
real life is more complicated and there are several problems with implemen-
tation of this measure in our estimation. First is that government produces
more than one public good. Moreover, many of them are hardly measurable
in quantity (such as defense or law-making) and, especially, quality. Sec-
ondly, even if we succeed in measuring these it will be hard to come up with
a uni¯ed indicator combining all factors and sorting all countries in terms of
their e±ciency. Therefore, governmental e±ciency may be more easily prox-
ied by the less direct indicators, both on the production side (such as level of
corruption, which eventually in°uences level of public good production) and
on the side of ¯nal outcomes (for instance, macroeconomic indicators of the
country - the better they are the more e±cient is, apparently, government).
At the same time, usage of such proxies makes the results of an estimation
less robust.
As a main proxy for governmental e±ciency we use Index of Economic
Freedom (IEF), issued yearly by the HF [2006]. IEF provides thorough ex-
amination of the factors in the country, which contribute to the economic
freedom and prosperity. All of them are related to the activity of the gov-
ernment. Namely, the index is the average of 10 indicators: trade policy,
¯scal burden of the government, government intervention in the economy,
monetary policy, capital °ows and foreign investment, banking and ¯nance,
wages and prices, property rights, regulation, and informal market activity.
All these ¯elds, apparently, are in°uenced by the governmental e±ciency.
19At the same time, economic freedom and e±ciency are not necessarily pos-
itively correlated. Such factors as government ownership in manufacturing
and banking or trade liberalization can have an ambiguous e®ect on the
country, and in particular on its attractiveness for investors. Therefore, we
slightly adjust the index for our needs. Namely, we exclude the ¯scal burden
from the average, since it is already accounted in the model, and in fact is
a main object for estimation. We experiment as well with the exclusion of
other factors from the ¯nal index, but these changes do not seem to a®ect
results signi¯cantly. As a result, we obtain the series varying from perfectly
free country's 1 to 5 for completely suppressed state. We also calculate rel-
ative e±ciency index (rel IEF). That is for a certain year we divide every
country's index by the average "rest-of-the-world" index, calculated for each
year using the same weights as for the tax rate.
In addition to IEF, we also test our model using other proxies for govern-
mental e±ciency. In particular, we report the results when GDP per capita
(GDP capita) is used instead. Indeed, the welfare of the population, char-
acterized quite closely by this indicator, should be a direct consequence of
governmental actions, including its policy towards attraction of investments.
In addition to GDP per capita, we also control for Leviathan state indicators,
in particular share of governmental employees compensation in the country's
GDP (govt compens). It can also be viewed as the proxy for governmental
e±ciency.
In order to satisfy the assumptions of our theoretical model as well as
in order to avoid endogeneity in our estimation we control for several other
factors. As a measure of the economy's openness we use amount of foreign
direct investments relative to GDP of the country (FDI/GDP). This way
the model's assumption about perfect capital mobility is satis¯ed. In ad-
dition, we control for the size of economy (GDP) and average investment
project's pro¯tability. As a proxy for this indicator we take annual GDP
growth (GDP growth). As it was mentioned above, we also include mea-
sure of Leviathan state (govt compens) in each regression. Finally, we add
country dummies19 to the model's speci¯cation in order to capture country-
speci¯c e®ects. However, we report results of the estimation both with and
without country dummies. Firstly, because we capture quite enough shocks
by other controls. Secondly, 28 new variables in the regression certainly bring
19Series xi such that xi(j) = 1 for country i in each year, and xi(j) = 0 for all other
countries
20Table 1: Data de¯nitions
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21multicolinearity and make results less robust.
De¯nitions, sources and certain statistical characteristics of the data used
in estimation are presented in the Table 1.
3.3 Results
The results are presented in the tables 2 and 3. Taking into account our
"hard" choice of proxies we report the received values for 5 weights in 2 dif-
ferent speci¯cations: ¯rst is when the proxy for governmental e±ciency is
Index of Economics Freedom, and second is when we use GDP per capita
instead. We include country dummies in both cases, even though the esti-
mation without them brings relatively analogous results (at least, signs of
the coe±cients studied do not change). The estimation method used in both
speci¯cations is 2SLS with instrumenting weighted average tax directly.22
At the same time, usage of IV's for country's individual tax rates and then
calculating weighted average brings analogous results in most cases. Finally,
the dependant variable used is EATR adjusted for country-speci¯c in°ation
and interest rates. Again, the directions of the coe±cients studied do not
change in most cases when statutory tax rate is used instead.23
The results reported in the tables ¯t quite well our theoretical predic-
tions. Indeed, the main prediction of our theoretical model was about the
in°uence of governmental e±ciency on the tax rate setting. Usage of both
proxies (IEF and GDP per capita) produced the results inline with the the-
ory. Namely, the countries with higher predicted governmental e±ciency,
proxied correspondingly by Index of Economic Freedom adjusted and GDP
per capita, tend to tax capital income heavier. The coe±cient near IEF is
negative in all 5 cases and signi¯cantly di®erent from 0. The p-value of it
does not exceed 3% level regardlessly of weights, which is very strong evi-
dence in favour of our predictions. The magnitude of the coe±cient, ¡0:05,
means that decrease in Index of Economic Freedom (without accounting a
¯scal burden) on 0:1 for some country, which is quite reasonable change for
1-year period,24 should lead to increase of the e®ective average tax rate on
0:5 percentage points (so that EATR rises from, say, 22% to 22:5%). This is
exactly what we predicted since IEF is by de¯nition greater for the govern-
22Refer to Section 3.1 for more details
23The exact magnitudes and t-statistics with these speci¯cations are not reported in the
paper. However, it is possible to obtain them directly from the author
24Refer to the Table 2 for maximal, minimal and average magnitudes of IEF
22ments, which are less e±cient, i.e. their average grade for di®erent policies
is high.25
At the same time, the coe±cient near GDP capita (see the Table 3) is
positive with very high signi¯cance. The p-values are somewhat lower than
in the case with IEF proxy, but still do not exceed 3% level. This is also
inline with our expectations, since higher incomes of the population, as it
was argued in the Section 3.1, is usually the outcome of e±cient actions of
the government. The magnitude of the coe±cient is small in levels but quite
signi¯cant economically, since GDP capita is measured in power purchasing
parity units in the sample, and the mean of it is a 5-digit number (20920
PPP units). As a result, according to our estimations, the increase in annual
population income on 1000 PPP (power purchasing parity) units, which is
inline with observed in reality GDP and population growths, will lead the
EATR to increase by about 0:7 percentage points. Therefore, usage of both
proxies support our theoretical predictions.
Additional prediction of our model was that the tax rate in a country
should react in the same direction to the changes of taxation levels in other
countries. The results, presented in the Tables 2 and 3, support this ¯nd-
ing too. Indeed, the coe±cient near "rest-of-the-world" tax, which basically
estimates the slope of the governmental reaction function, is signi¯cantly
positive in all 10 cases.26 The p-value ranges here from 10 to less than 3
percents, which is comparable with other empirical estimations of interjuris-
dictional competition in the literature.27 The magnitude of the coe±cient
is quite big comparing with the results from other studies. However, it is
comparable with the results of similar estimation in tax competition.28 In
addition, in the most interesting cases of GDP and FDI geogr weights the
change in the "rest-of-the-world" tax rate is forecasted to produce the change
of almost the same magnitude in the country's tax rate (coe±cient changes
from 0.74 to 2.42 in di®erent speci¯cations). It means that if world's average
capital income tax rate (with di®erent weights) increases by 1 percentage
point, the response of a government of a considered country would also be
increase EATR on 1 percentage point, given there are no changes in other
controls.
It is worth noting again that the results presented are quite robust.
25See the discussion about our choice of proxies in the Section 3.1
265 kinds of weights over 2 proxies for governmental e±ciency
27See Brueckner [2003] for a survey
28See, for example, Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano [forthcoming]
23Table 2: The results of the estimation: IEF as proxy
Dependent Variable: EATR
Method: Least Squares
Number of observations: 280
Proxy for governmental e±ciency: IEF







































































0.65 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.64
24Table 3: The results of the estimation: GDP per capita as proxy
Dependent Variable: EATR
Method: Least Squares
Number of observations: 280
Proxy for governmental e±ciency: GDP capita









































































0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64
25Firstly, they are consistent through all 5 kinds of wages. Secondly, when
another speci¯cation is used the results do not change signi¯cantly. Namely,
it concerns choice of dependant variable, choice of proxy for governmen-
tal e±ciency, method of IV estimation, and inclusion of country dummies.
Therefore, we can conclude that strong support of our theory is found.
4 Conclusions
This paper studies the in°uence of the relative governmental e±ciency on
the outcome of international tax competition game between two countries.
By the relative e±ciency here we mean the fact that the more e±cient gov-
ernment is the more units of the public good it is able to produce out of one
unit of the private good. We build the model with two countries, engaged
in the competition for foreign investments. Multinationals are assumed to
be technologically 'attached' to the level of the public good provision in the
country, i.e. the more of the public good is provided by the country the less it
costs to produce there. Therefore, they make their choice of the investment
placement based not only on the tax rate they face, but also on the potential
reduction of the production costs.
We ¯nd, that in equilibrium more e±cient country always sets the tax
higher than the less e±cient one. Moreover, the response functions of the
governments are found to be increasing, which is in compliance with the
existing literature. Another ¯nding is that the reaction functions become
steeper with the increase in governmental e±ciency.
Further, the model is empirically tested on 28 countries, years from 1996
to 2005. We ¯nd "the-rest-of-the-world" average tax rate and the govern-
mental e±ciency to a®ect signi¯cantly positively the tax rate in a certain
country, which supports the conclusions of the model. We also ¯nd quite a
strong evidence in favor of our predictions on slope of the reaction function.
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29A Proofs of the propositions
A.1 Lemma 2.1
Firm s compares its after-tax pro¯ts in both countries:
¦A = p ¡ c ¡ ¿A + slngA vs: ¦B = p ¡ c ¡ ¿B + slngB (19)
Immediately few cases are clear:
² If ¿A ¸ ¿B and gA · gB
33 then ¯rm of any type will pay less taxes in
country B and receive more public inputs. Therefore, ^ sB = 1.
² On a contrary, if ¿A · ¿B and gA ¸ gB then all ¯rms will invest in
country A: ^ sB = 0
² The case, we are interested in, is when ¿A > ¿B and gA > gB. Firm s
will invest in country B if:
¦A = p ¡ c ¡ ¿A + slngA < ¦B = p ¡ c ¡ ¿B + slngB (20)
With the given restrictions on tax rates and levels of public good pro-








^ s if ¿A ¡ ¿B < lngA ¡ lngB;
1 otherwise; (22)
which was needed to prove.
Note that ¿A 6= ¿B in this case, so ^ s is never 0. Moreover, ^ s is the
solution of the equation:
¦A = ¦B; (23)
i.e. if di®erence in tax rates is su±ciently small (refer to equation (22))
then ^ s is the type of ¯rm, which is indi®erent between investing in
either of two countries.
² The ¯nal case, when ¿A < ¿B and gA < gB will lead us to the inequality,
similar to (21), only with the reverse sign. As a result, ^ sB = 1 ¡ ^ s, if
again the di®erence in tax rates is not too big. Otherwise, ^ sB = 0.
33We assume that tax rates and levels of public good provision cannot be equal simul-
taneously. If it is so, then ^ sB is undetermined
30A.2 Lemma 2.2
Suppose the strategy of the government B is to play (¿B;gB). Government
A has then several options:
i. ¿A = ¿B; gA = gB+ - "mimicking" strategy. Using its relative e±ciency
government A can set the tax rate to ¿B and produce slightly more of
public good. This way it attracts all the ¯rms to the country, so the
revenue of A is:
Rev




ii. ¿A > ¿B; gA · gB - unfeasible strategy, since all ¯rms invest in country
B in this case;
iii. ¿A · ¿B; gA > gB - A does not play this strategy either - even though
all ¯rms invest in A in this case, revenue is higher with "mimicking"
strategy;
iv. ¿A < ¿B; gA < gB - "decrease" strategy;
v. ¿A > ¿B; gA > gB - "increase" strategy.
First we note that A is always better playing "increase" strategy than
"decrease" strategy. Indeed, it is cheap for A to produce public goods, and
it can attract ¯rms by doing that at the same time increasing the tax rate.
Now we have to check if "increase" strategy is better than "mimicking"
strategy. Assume A chooses strategy:
¿A = ¿B + ²; gA = gB + ¹; ² > 0; ¹ > 0; (25)
Then the revenue of A is:
Rev
I = (¿B + ²)(1 ¡
²





"Increase" strategy is better than "mimicking" strategy if there exist such










ln(gB + ¹) ¡ lngB
> 0 (27)
31Obviously, when gB > 0 for su±ciently high ¿B this inequality does not hold
for any values of ² and ¹ (satisfying governmental budget constraint). This
way we have proved part (i) of the lemma.
To prove part (ii) of the lemma we will use inequality (27) again. When
gB ! 0, for any ¿B including 0, the tax base of the government A goes to 1
regardlessly of the increase in the tax rate. Therefore, to get bigger revenue
A should just raise the tax more than the level of public good provision.
Choosing ² >
¹
b A is better o® when playing "increase" strategy.
Finally, part (iii) follows from the fact that government B always plays
"decrease" strategy. Indeed, B does not have an advantage before A, and
"mimicking" A brings it zero revenue (for some values of ¿A and gA playing
this strategy even violates budget constraint).
A.3 Proposition 2.4








B is obviously increasing in ¿A.






















Now, if we increase ¿B the identity (30) holds if either ¢ or g¤
A¢ increases.
¢ increases with ¿B if and only if
±g¤
A














since ¢ is positive by the setup of the problem. As a result, we have to have
±g¤
A
±¿B > 0, since otherwise both ¢ and g¤
A¢ will be decreasing with ¿B, and

















+ 1) > 0; (32)
32so optimal response of government A increases with ¿B.
The proof of the second statement of the proposition follows the same
logic as the proof of the ¯rst statement. From the identity (30):










)] # ) [g
¤
A¢] " or ¢ " (33)
Analogously to the proof of the previous statement, it can be shown that
±g¤
A
±b > 0, and because of that ±¢
±b > 0. Therefore, ¿¤
A is increasing with b.
33